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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
will be able to pay escheat claims without fear of dual liability.
Furthermore, escheat revenues, by this rule, will be apportioned
ratably among the various states according to the commercial
activity of their residents. Finally, by adopting both an equitable
and practical test, the Court has saved itself from a potential
flood of original-jurisdiction suits to determine questions of
fact.
However, the narrowly defined power of the states to escheat
intangibles must be juxtaposed against the expansion of state power
to tax intangible property. As indicated previously, any state offer-
ing benefit or protection to property could tax it. More precisely, tax-
ation within constitutional limitations, could feasibly subvert the intent
of the "last-known address" doctrine. For example, a corporation
domiciled in State A owes monies to several creditors whose last-
known addresses are in State B. State B, pursuant to the Texas
case, statutorily escheats the monies. State A could, because the
power of its laws makes the debt enforceable, impose a substantial
tax on the right to escheat that property. Thus, State A would
effectively deprive State B of the possible escheat revenue. Such
a tax appears permissible under the wide latitude of tax jurisdiction
afforded by the Supreme Court.
This hypothetical brings into sharp focus the tendencies inherent
in the Court's treatment of intangible property in the areas of
taxation and escheat. It also seems to necessitate the development
of a unifying principle for multistate taxation of intangible property.
The Supreme Court was able. in the laboratory conditions of a
case of first impression, to adopt both a practical and equitable
principle. However. by doing so. the Court has solved but one
of a great many complex and interdependent problems.
V
CRIMINAL LAW - KIDNAPING- DETENTION INCIDENTAL TO
CRIME OF ROBBERY HELD NOT KIDNAPING.- In a recent criminal
prosecution the jury found that the defendants forced their way
into the complainants' car, and while one of them drove the car,
the other appropriated complainants' jewelry and case. The trip
covered twenty-seven city blocks and took twenty minutes. The
defendants were convicted of kidnaping, in addition to robbery
and criminal possession of a pistol. In reversing the conviction
on the kidnaping count, the Court of Appeals held that the crime
committed was essentially robbery, reasoning that the restraint
imposed upon the complainants was merely incidental to the com-
mission of that crime and did not constitute the separate crime
of kidnaping. People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256
N.Y.S.2d 793 (1965).
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At common law the crime of kidnaping was defined as the
forcible stealing away of an individual from his own country to
another 1 and was punishable as a misdemeanor.2  In the United
States the penal statutes of some states have modified this common-
law concept.3 Removal to a foreign jurisdiction is no longer a
necessary element. However, in addition to the common-law
requirement of unlawful seizure, the elements of secret confinement
and extortion have generally been required to constitute kidnaping.4
Furthermore, under the language of the modem tatutes, the
definition of the crime of kidnaping has been expanded.5  Pur-
suant to such a statute,6 the New York courts have designated
three distinct types of conduct as susceptible of being punished
as kidnaping.'
Given its broadest construction, the statute encompasses conduct
involving merely a forcible and unlawful detention." For example,
in Cowan v. Tennessee 9 the defendant detained two girls in a car
for seven hours while he unsuccessfully exhorted them to have
sexual relations with him. This was found sufficient to constitute
kidnaping although there was no asportation of the victims.
When the statute is construed liberally it will include instances
where the victim is detained solely for the purpose of facilitating
some other crime. For example, a bank robber will often tie
up his victim and move him to another room. Such detention
and asportation fall within the modern statutory definition of
kidnaping, although by traditional definitions the conduct would
clearly not be kidnaping.10  In People v. Florio," for example,
I PERHINS, CRIMINAL LAW § 7a (1957).
2Ibid.
3Kidnaping is punishable as a capital offense in over half of the Am-
erican jurisdictions, including New York. 26 J. Cain. L., C. & P.S. 763(1936); see N.Y. PEx. LAW § 1250(3).
4CLARIC & MARSHALL, LAW OF CRIMEs § 223 (4th ed. 1940). See also
People v. La Marca, 3 N.Y.2d 452, 144 N.E.2d 420, 165 N.Y.S.2d 753, cert.
denied, 355 US. 920 (1957).
5 See Note, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 540, 451 nn. 8, 9 (1953).
6 N.Y. PEr. LAW § 1250 reads: "A person who wilfully seizes, confines,
inveigles, or kidnaps another, with intent to cause him without authority of
law, to be confined or imprisoned within the state, or to be sent out of the
state, or to be sold as a slave, or in any way held to service or kept or
detained, against his will . . . is guilty of kidnaping...."
7See generally Note, 15 AILANY L. Rr~v. 65, 75-77 (1951).
8 See People v. Hope, 257 N.Y. 147, 177 N.E. 402 (1931).
9 208 Tenn. 512, 347 S.W.2d 37 (1961). See also State v. Jacobs, 93
Ariz. 336, 380 P.2d 998, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 46 (1963); People v.
Oliver, 55 Cal. 2d 761, 361 P.2d 593 (1961).
10 Accord, People v. Rosenthal, 289 N.Y. 482, 46 N.E.2d 895 (1943);
People v. Koslow, 6 App. Div. 2d 713, 174 N.Y.S2d 709 (2d Dep't 1958).11301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950). See also People v. Wein, 50 Cal.
2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958); People v. Ogane-
soff, 81 Cal. App. 2d 709, 184 P.2d 953 (1947); People v. Dugger, 5 Cal.
2d 337, 54 P.2d 707 (1936).
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the defendants inveigled a woman into their car, and transported
her from Manhattan to Queens where they raped her. The New
York Court of Appeals held that the defendants were properly
convicted of kidnaping and rape, notwithstanding that the ab-
duction and asportation were merely incidental to and facilitative of
the rape.
The third kind of conduct punishable as kidnaping under the
New York statute concerns the defendant's activity after he has
completed a crime. Here the defendant, in attempting to safely
depart, forces his victim to accompany him as a hostage. 2 For
example, in People v. Black '" the defendant entered the com-
plainants' home with an intent to rob them. After taking their
money, he forced one of them to become his hostage and took
her to another state detaining her for a considerable time. The
appellate division affirmed the convictions for kidnaping and robbery,
stating that the kidnaping occurred after the robbery and, therefore,
the crimes had no connection with each other "except insofar as the
defendant might have believed that a hostage would give him some
insurance against close pursuit." 14
The broad language of the New York statute has thus been
shown to be subject to a variety of interpretations which define
conduct as kidnaping although the acts committed would not be so
considered under traditional definitions. 15  In contrast to this
broad construction, the United States Supreme Court, in con-
struing the similarly phrased federal kidnaping statute,1" felt con-
strained to give it limited application. Thus, in Chatwin v. United
States,1 7 the defendants were convicted under the federal statute
for inveigling, decoying and transporting a child from Utah to
Arizona. In reversing the conviction, the Court rejected a loose
construction of the statutory language since it "conceivably could
lead to the punishment of anyone who induced another to leave
his surroundings and do some innocent or illegal act of benefit
to the former . .. " 18 The purpose of the act, said the Court,
12 See People v. Kristy, 4 Cal. 2d 504, 50 P.2d 798, cert. denied, 297
U.S. 712 (1935).
13 18 App. Div. 2d 719 236 N.Y.S.2d 240 (2d Dep't 1962) (memorandum
decision), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 898 (1963).
.14id. at 721, 236 N.Y.S.2d at 243.
15 For a profitable discussion see MA us & PAPERNO, CRIMINAL LAW IN
NEW YORK §§ 116-22 (1961).
16 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1958). "Whoever knowingly transports in inter-
state or foreign commerce, any person who has been unlawfully seized, con-
fined, inveigled, decoyed, or kidnapped, abducted or carried away and held
for ransom or reward or otherwise [is guilty of kidnaping]. . . ." The
statute was passed in answer to public indignation over the kidnaping and
subsequent death of Charles A. Lindbergh's son. It has come to be called
the "Lindbergh Law."
17326 U.S. 455 (1946).is Id. at 464.
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"was to outlaw interstate kidnappings rather than general trans-
gressions of morality involving the crossing of state lines." 19
Thus, the Court limited the application of the federal statute to
acts which are similar to the conventional concept of kidnaping.20
In the instant case the Court of Appeals had the opportunity
to reconsider the New York statute in light of Chatwin, as well
as recent comments on the subject of kidnaping.21 The Court
stated that the statute must be limited to kidnaping in the con-
ventional sense. Thus the Court, in contrast to prior precedent,
narrowly construed the broad language of the statute, eliminating
the possibility that future defendants would be convicted of kid-
naping for conduct similar to that found in Cowan and Florio.
The majority indicated that while the statute might literally include
several other crimes, it should be applied only in situations where
the asportation of a person under restraint and compulsion con-
stituted a separate crime of kidnaping.22 The statute, said the
Court, would no longer be applicable to restraints which "have
long been treated as integral parts of other crimes.12  In applying
the statute to the instant case the Court indicated that here the
crime committed was essentially robbery. The detention and asporta-
tion in the automobile were merely incidental to the commission
of that crime; they did not constitute the separate crime of
kidnaping.
In contrast, the dissenting judges argued that the statute
was designed to reduce the criminal practice of detaining victims
even when the detention was an integral element of the crime.
Furthermore, the dissent expressed the fear that the practice
of taking hostages might very well be encouraged as a result of
the majority opinion. Ostensibly, this practice of taking hostages
could present a serious police enforcement problem. However, it
appears that these difficulties would be substantially resolved if the
proposed revision to the New York Penal Law is adopted.2
Proposed section 140.15 attempts to specifically define the crime
of kidnaping as to what are commonly conceived to be "genuine
29 Ibid.
20 The Court stated that "the broadness of the statutory language does
not permit us to tear the words out of their context.. . [and] apply them to
unattractive or immoral situations lacking the involuntariness of seizure and
detention which is the very essence of the crime of kidnapping."
21 See, e.g., Note, 53 CoLum. L. REv. 540 (1953); Note, 35 So. CAL. L.
REv. 212 (1962); Note, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1961); Comment, 11
STAz. L. REv. 554 (1959).
22 People v. Levy, 15 N.Y.2d 159, 204 N.E.2d 842, 256 N.Y.S.2d 793
(1965).23 Id. at 164, 204 N.E.2d at 844, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
24 PRooszn N.Y. PEN. LAW, S. Int. 3918; A. Int 5376 (1964), (here-
inafter cited as PROPOSED N.Y. Pm. LAW).
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kidnaping" cases. Under the proposed statute, 5 a person may be
convicted of kidnaping when:
(1) he unlawfully
(a) removes another person from his place of residence
or business; or
(b) removes him a substantial distance from the vicinity
where the removal commences; or
(c) confines him for a substantial period in a place of
isolation; and when
(2) his intent is
(a) to hold such person for ransom; or
(b) to use him as a shield or hostage; or
(c) to inflict physical injury upon him, or to violate or
abuse him sexually; or
(d) to terrorize him or a third person; or
(e) to interfere with the performance of any govern-
mental or political function.
If the instant case were decided under the proposed law the
outcome would be the same. However, the fear expressed by the dis-
senting judges that criminals will increase the practice of detaining
their victims during the commission of a crime would be abro-
gated, because express provision is made in the proposed law
for the prosecution of criminals for kidnaping if they employ
their victims as shields or hostages.
While such terms in the proposed law as "substantial distance"
and "substantial period" are objectionable as imprecise and hence
subject to arbitrary application, they would probably be construed
in light of the Court's decision in the instant case. However,
although the Court expressly overruled the Florio decision, under
the language of the proposed statute, a conviction on similar facts
would probably be upheld.
2 6
It is submitted that the proposed revision presents a rational
solution to the problem of kidnaping. The proposed legislation
would abrogate criticism of the principal case by law enforcement
officers, while it would protect criminals against the arbitrary and
excessive imposition of penalties.27 By their definition of kidnaping
the Revisers of the Penal Law have succeeded in specifically defining
25 PROPOSED N.Y. PEN. LAW § 140.15. The proposed revision has the
further refinement of punishing other forms of unlawful removal under lesser
offenses such as false imprisonment or custodial interference.
26The defendants would be convicted of kidnaping because they removed
their victim a "substantial distance" with "intent' to abuse her sexually. See
PROPOSED N.Y. PEN. LAW § 140.15 (2) (c).
27 See, e.g., MoDEL PENAL CODE § 212.1, comment at 13-14 (Tent. Draft
No. 11, 1960); cf. Packer, The Case for Revision of the Penal Law, 13
STAN. L. REV. 252 (1961).
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a serious crime, as it has now come to be understood, and which,
under the present law, is ill-defined and arbitrarily applied.
Until the proposed revision is adopted the holding in the
instant case will have a marked effect on prior precedent. Since
the Court limited the applicability of the statute to kidnaping in
the conventional sense, no longer will detention alone as in Cowan,
or detention and asportation as in Florio, be sufficient to con-
stitute the wholly independent crime of kidnaping. Rather, the
Court limits the statute to conduct as that found in Black where
the restraint constituted the completely separate crime of kidnaping.
However, it is difficult to predict the effect of the instant decision
to other factual situations since the Court expressly indicates that
whether or not the conduct will constitute the separate crime
of kidnaping depends on the facts and circumstances involved. In
any event, the Court has sharply curtailed the applicability of the
present penal statute. No longer will an individual be convicted of
kidnaping, one of our most serious crimes, when his conduct is merely
incidental to the commission of another crime.
X
CRIM!INAL PROCEDURE - CONFESSIONS - Nnw PROCEDURE
GOVERNING ADmISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS APPLIED RETROAC-
TIVELY. - In 1960, defendant was convicted of robbery in the
first degree after a trial in which, pursuant to New York
procedure, the issue of the voluntariness of his confession was
submitted to the same jury that determined his guilt. The appellate
division affirmed the conviction and the court of appeals, denied
defendant's application for leave to appeal. Subsequently, the
New York procedure was declared unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Jackson v. Denno.1 The
New York Court of Appeals, after favorably reconsidering de-
fendant's application, held that although defendant ordinarily could
claim no further appellate relief, he was entitled to a redetermina-
tion on the admissibility of his confession. The Court stated that
a coram nobis motion is the appropriate procedure for contesting
such prior convictions,2 and that the "Massachusetts procedure"
would be used in future trials to determine the admissibility of
allegedly coerced confessions. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72,
204 N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
Whether retroactive application should be given to newly
declared law is a problem to which history has not supplied
1378 U.S. 368 (1964).
2 For a detailed analysis of the coram nobis motion, see Comment, 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 467 (1962).
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